LEX CORP NEWS LETTER

The Recovery That Isn't

For those market boosters who are prattling on about the possibility of a "jobless recovery," I offer an invitation to join me for a breakfast of "fat-free bacon," "eggless omelets," and "no-carb bread." As unappetizing as such a meal may sound, it would nevertheless offer more substance than the oxymoronic concept of an economic resurgence without job creation.

Those who do cling to the absurd belief that, absent exponential productivity gains, the economy can expand while workers are being laid off will undergo a massive test of their convictions now that it's clear the employment picture is bleak. Today's weaker-than-expected report on non-farm payrolls revealed that employers shed 263,000 jobs in September. The losses propelled the headline unemployment rate to a 26-year high of 9.8%. U6, the Bureau of Labor Statistics' most complete measure of unemployment, has risen to a dismal 17%. This figure includes those people who want to work full time, but have simply given up looking, or who have accepted part-time work in the interim. As it is similar to the methodology used during the Great Depression, U6 offers better historical perspective on the severity of our current crisis.

Taken together with yesterday's larger-than-expected pickup in unemployment claims (first time claims rose by 17,000 to 551,000), today's report makes it certain that the job market is still contracting, even while some indicators like GDP and consumer confidence are moving in the opposite direction.

There is no question that the sense of panic has temporarily subsided. In recent interviews, Treasury Secretary Geithner has been almost giddy in his descriptions of the recovery – all the while crediting his own policies for averting disaster. Americans are once again taking the government's bait by spending money they don't have to buy things they can't afford. Evidence of this trend was contained in data released earlier this week which showed that even while income growth was largely stagnant, U.S. consumers showed the biggest month-over-month increase in personal spending in ten years! With the same report showing a 25% drop in the savings rate, the source of the spending money is clear. But depleting savings and increasing borrowing does not a recovery make.

To really recuperate, the government must allow market forces to restructure our economy. The government and individuals must rein in their spending; we must replenish our stock of savings, allow interest rates to rise, asset prices to adjust to economic reality, insolvent businesses to fail, and wages to reflect productivity. To accomplish these goals, subsidies that distort market forces must be removed and regulations that undermine our competitiveness must be repealed.

None of this can be accomplished without a degree of short-term economic pain. However, if we endure it, the payback will be a real recovery with plenty of new jobs that don't rely on government stimulus money. If we refuse to allow the economy to experience a real recession, we will never have the benefit of a real recovery. Instead, we get the "jobless recovery," a veneer of apparently positive indicators that merely obscures the underlying rot.

Over the last few decades, our industrial job market has atrophied while service- and public-sector jobs have grown unsustainably. We must restore balance. New jobs will have to come from areas that produce goods; bloated service and government sectors must be allowed to shrink. By propping up the sectors that need to contract, and running staggering budget deficits, the government cuts off the capital necessary to fund sectors that need to expand.

In truth, many of the service-sector jobs that exist today, such as real estate sales, mortgage finance, home improvement, and auto sales, were created in an environment of ever-increasing home equity, rising stock prices, and almost unlimited access to cheap consumer credit. With home equity gone, stock markets flat, and credit depleted, Americans find themselves needing to save rather than spend. But Washington has put through policies that have counteracted our good instincts.

While we were focusing our economy on consumer spending, much of the rest of the world was saving for the future. As such, we must begin to produce more for export, so that we can sell goods to those who have the savings to pay for them. That is the only way we can repay our debts, replenish our savings, repair our infrastructure, and rebuild our industrial base.

Another prerequisite to any real economic expansion is the potential for business owners to earn profits. With increased regulation and higher taxes on the way, these incentives are being diminished. In fact, via a phenomenon called 'regime uncertainty,' our current policy path is actually encouraging businesses to contract in order to prepare for a more hostile business environment.

Robust economies utilize all spare capacity, or restructure it for better use. Having 17% of our able-bodied population sitting at home or working part-time at Cinnabon indicates that our present policies are weakening the economy – even if GDP is growing. There is no "jobless recovery," only senseless cheerleading.

Obama Puts the Economic Cart before the Horse

In his first televised speech before Congress, President Obama asserted that prosperity will return once the government restores the flow of credit in the economy. It may come as a surprise to him, but an economy cannot run on consumer loans. Furthermore, credit stopped flowing in the U.S. for a very good reason: there was no more savings left to loan. Government efforts to simply make credit available, without rebuilding productive capacity or increasing savings, are doomed to destroy what's left of our economy.

The central tenets of Obamanomics appear to be that access to credit will enable people to borrow money to buy stuff, the spending will spur production and employment, and thus the economy will grow. It's a neat and simple picture, but it has nothing whatsoever to do with how an economy works. The President does not understand that consumption is made possible by production and that credit is made possible by savings. The size and complexity of modern economies has obscured these simple concepts, but reducing the picture to a small scale can help clear away the fog.

Suppose there is a very small barter-based economy consisting of only three individuals, a butcher, a baker, and a candlestick maker. If the candlestick maker wants bread or steak, he makes candles and trades. The candlestick maker always wants food, but his demand can only be satisfied if he makes candles, without which he goes hungry. The mere fact that he desires bread and steak is meaningless.

Enter the magic wand of credit, which many now assume can take the place of production. Suppose the butcher has managed to produce an excess amount of steak and has more than he needs on a daily basis. Knowing this, the candlestick maker asks to borrow a steak from the butcher to trade to the baker for bread. For this transaction to take place the butcher must first have produced steaks which he did not consume (savings). He then loans his savings to the candlestick maker, who issues the butcher a note promising to repay his debt in candlesticks.

In this instance, it was the butcher's production of steak that enabled the candlestick maker to buy bread, which also had to be produced. The fact that the candlestick maker had access to credit did not increase demand or bolster the economy. In fact, by using credit to buy instead of candles, the economy now has fewer candles, and the butcher now has fewer steaks with which to buy bread himself. What has happened is that through savings, the butcher has loaned his purchasing power, created by his production, to the candlestick maker, who used it to buy bread.

Similarly, the candlestick maker could have offered “IOU candlesticks” directly to the baker. Again, the transaction could only be successful if the baker actually baked bread that he did not consume himself and was therefore able to loan his savings to the candlestick maker. Since he loaned his bread to the candlestick maker, he no longer has that bread himself to trade for steak.

The existence of credit in no way increases aggregate consumption within this community, it merely temporarily alters the way consumption is distributed. The only way for aggregate consumption to increase is for the production of candlesticks, steak, and bread to increase.

One way credit could be used to grow this economy would be for the candlestick maker to borrow bread and steak for sustenance while he improves the productive capacity of his candlestick-making equipment. If successful, he could repay his loans with interest out of his increased production, and all would benefit from greater productivity. In this case the under-consumption of the butcher and baker led to the accumulation of savings, which were then loaned to the candlestick maker to finance capital investments. Had the butcher and baker consumed all their production, no savings would have been accumulated, and no credit would have been available to the candlestick maker, depriving society of the increased productivity that would have followed.

On the other hand, had the candlestick maker merely borrowed bread and steak to sustain himself while taking a vacation from candlestick making, society would gain nothing, and there would be a good chance the candlestick maker would default on the loan. In this case, the extension of consumer credit squanders savings which are now no longer available to finance other capital investments.

What would happen if a natural disaster destroyed all the equipment used to make candlesticks, bread and steak? Confronted with dangerous shortages of food and lighting, Barack Obama would offer to stimulate the economy by handing out pieces of paper called money and guaranteeing loans to whomever wants to consume. What good would the money do? Would these pieces of paper or loans make goods magically appear?

The mere introduction of paper money into this economy only increases the ability of the butcher, baker, and candlestick maker to bid up prices (measured in money, not trade goods) once goods are actually produced again. The only way to restore actual prosperity is to repair the destroyed equipment and start producing again.

The sad truth is that the productive capacity of the American economy is now largely in tatters. Our industrial economy has been replaced by a reliance on health care, financial services and government spending. Introducing freer flowing credit and more printed money into such a system will do nothing except spark inflation. We need to get back to the basics of production. It won't be easy, but it will work.

President Obama would have us believe that we can all spend the day relaxing in a tub while his printing press does all the work for us. The problem comes when you get out of the tub to go to dinner and the only thing on your plate is an IOU for steak.

For a more in depth analysis of our financial problems and the inherent dangers they pose for the U.S. economy and U.S. dollar, read my just released book "The Little Book of Bull Moves in Bear Markets." Click here to order your copy now.

The latest commentary from John Browne, senior market analyst for Euro Pacific Capital.

Bonds in 2009: A Tough Call

The second half of 2008 will be remembered as the era in which justifiably panicked investors fled the global equity markets and flooded into the bond markets, particularly the U.S. Treasury market. As I write this, the migration largely continues.

For those investors and market observers who put a high premium on rationality it seems perverse that so many are accepting the historically low returns offered in the U.S. Treasury market, particularly in the short end, where yields are near zero. At some intra-day prices, yields have even turned negative.

While somewhat bereft of investment merit, I am not surprised by the strong upward moves of U.S. Treasuries, which was by far the best performing asset class of 2008. For better or worse, the majority of investors still consider Treasuries as the ultimate safe haven, and it is therefore understandable that they would rally in times of uncertainty. But now, I urge some caution.

Ian Fleming’s hero, 007, used to introduce himself with the signature phrase, “Bond—James Bond.” It struck caution into many of his opponents. Today, at the outset of 2009, the term ‘bonds’, especially junk bonds, should strike apprehension into the hearts of most conservative investors.

In the initial stages of a recession, it is wise to run to cash, or Treasuries. Emboldened by the healthy returns in Treasuries in 2008, and confidence that government stimuli will provide solvency to the private sector, some investors may be tempted to ‘play’ the corporate and even junk bond markets as the Fed lowers its key interest rates.

However, as recessions mature, things change subtly. Demand for riskier junk bonds will remain suppressed by the lingering of demand for long-dated Treasuries, which may even increase for two main reasons.

First, there is greater risk that many corporate bond issuers, especially of junk bonds, will collapse and default on their bonds. These growing fears force increasing funds into Treasuries, driving prices ever higher and yields lower.

Second, as historically low yields continue to decline on short-dated Treasuries, many investors who have become focused on current yield rather than on total return, are tempted to move into long dated Treasuries.

In mid-December, the Fed lowered its key rates, putting downward pressure on the U.S. dollar and raising the specter of high inflation. However, sensing the possible sale of long-dated Treasuries, Fed chairman Bernanke took the unusual step of assuring investors that the Fed was likely to buy large amounts of long-dated Treasuries. This caused renewed investor faith in long Treasuries. With Treasury demand thus stimulated, I do not expect a near term rally in corporate debt instruments.

The longer view however is much different. As Fed Chairman Bernanke beckons investors towards long-dated Treasuries, the danger on the rocks is being consistently ignored.

And although these bonds may indeed remain strong for now, it is likely that the revered U.S. Treasury market is becoming the next asset bubble ripe for explosion. Such a dramatic development could be caused by a number of fundamental reasons.

First, as the recession deepens, it will become apparent to all that the Fed has no will to fight inflation. Worse still, it will likely be seen that the U.S. Administration is diverting its vast resources away from restructuring and infrastructure spending towards the potentially inflationary, socialist-style prevention of restructuring through the subsidization of clinically dead companies, like the U.S. auto industry.

Second, the Government can be expected to issue vast amounts of additional long-term debt. Third, foreign central banks will be forced to spend internally on their own domestic stimulus packages. These major investors, especially China, will buy progressively less U.S. Treasuries and may even become major net sellers, driving prices down.

Finally, if America loses its prestigious triple-A credit rating, the prices of its Treasury bonds will plummet.

With the safe haven of U.S. Treasuries threatened, investors may increasingly turn to the refuge of the sovereign debt of hard currency nations, gold and even to the top rated companies in economies like China, where the government has massive amounts of cash to spend on competitive restructuring and infrastructure.

In short, risky U.S. debt instruments will have no fundamental drivers in 2009. U.S. government debt has a brighter short term future but in the end may be just as dangerous.

For a more in-depth analysis of our financial problems and the inherent dangers they pose for the U.S. economy and U.S. dollar, read Peter Schiff's just released book "The Little Book of Bull Moves in Bear Markets." Click here to order your copy now.

For a look back at how Peter predicted our current problems read his 2007 bestseller "Crash Proof: How to Profit from the Coming Economic Collapse." Click here to order a copy today.

October 19th 2008

The current stock market crash has spurred a vital national debate about the causes and catalysts of the Great Depression. The dominant school of thought believes that the stubborn refusal of then president Hebert Hoover to intervene after the stock market crash of 1929, and his preference for free market solutions, led directly to the ensuing decade-long catastrophe. Through this lens, our leaders assure us that the most recent raft of government measures will prevent another episode of bread lines, Hoovervilles and pencil salesmen. As usual they have it completely wrong. In my view, the Depression was created precisely because Hoover followed the path that our government is now taking.

When the stock market bubble of the Roaring Twenties (which was created as a result of the loose monetary policy of the newly created Federal Reserve) finally popped, Hoover would not allow market forces to correct the imbalances. His policies were aimed at propping up unsound businesses, artificially supporting prices, particularly wages, and providing Federal funds for public works projects. These moves went well beyond the progressive reforms of Teddy Roosevelt, and established Hoover as the most interventionist president ever up to that point. In fact, much of what eventually became the New Deal had its roots in Hoover's policies.

However, at the time, there were those who recommended a different course. Andrew Mellon, the long-serving Secretary of the Treasury whom Hoover had inherited from the prior two Republican Administrations, was labeled by Hoover as a "leave it alone isolationist" who wanted to "liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, and liquidate real estate." Hoover would have none of it. In fact, during his nomination speech for his second term, Hoover bragged "We determined that we would not follow the advice of the bitter liquidationists and see the whole body of debtors of the United States brought to bankruptcy and the savings of our people brought to destruction."

Hoover chose to ignore the sound advice of his Treasury Secretary (in contrast to today where the current Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson is actually leading the charge over the cliff) and instead used every tool at his disposal to "fix" the problem. As a result, rather than allowing a recession to run its course, with healthy and rapid liquidations of the mal-investments built up during the boom, Hoover inadvertently created what became the Great Depression.

When Roosevelt took office he continued the same failed policies only on a grander scale. The magnitude and the idiocy of many New Deal programs, such as the wage and price setting National Recovery Administration (NRA), compounded the problems. So while Mellon's advice would have caused a sharp but relatively brief economic downturn (which occurred after the Panic of 1907, for example), the Depression plodded on for nearly a decade until the country began gearing up for the Second World War.

In an amazing feat of revisionist history, somehow Hoover's interventionist policies have been completely forgotten. It is taken as fundamental that his inaction led to the Depression and Roosevelt's "heroics" got us out. Unfortunately, since we have learned nothing from history, we are about to repeat the very mistakes that lead to the most dire economic circumstance of the last century.

A major difference however, is that the structure of the U.S economy today is far weaker than it was in the fall of 1929. Years of reckless consumer borrowing and spending, and enormous trade and budget deficits have resulted in a hollowed out industrial base and an unmanageable mountain of debt owed to foreign creditors. Instead of the support of a strong currency backed by gold, the public now must deal with a modern Fed free to print as much money as politicians want. So rather than getting the benefits of falling consumer prices (as happened during the Depression), consumers today will contend with much higher consumer prices, even as the economy contracts.

With Barack Obama now waiting in the wings to conjure a newer New Deal, far larger than even FDR could have imagined, and at a time when we cannot even afford the old one, this will not be your grandfather's Depression. It may be much worse.

The Tales Get Taller

When inexplicable events perplexed our early forbears, village wise men concocted elaborate and colorful explanations to soothe the populace. Earthquakes, hailstorms, and solar eclipses were all ascribed to root causes that made sense to the villagers and increased the esteem of the story tellers. The recent, unexpected surge of the U.S. dollar has led many Wall Street witch doctors to conjure a series of logic-defying tales to give reason to what is surely the random scramble of a confused herd. Wall Street spun similar yarns during the dot.com and real estate bubbles as investors groped for reasons to justify sky high prices.

The recent surge, which has pushed the dollar up more than 30% against some currencies in recent months, is purely a short-term technical phenomenon. The move is caused by global investment deleveraging, in which major financial players are reversing (unwinding) risky trades and piling into what is erroneously perceived as the safest haven they can find. Increasingly, foreign assets, many of which had appreciated more than American assets, have been sold, and the proceeds stashed into U.S. Treasury bonds, which these investors believe to be the Fort Knox of finance. The cascade has caused momentum trades, margin calls, redemptions, and other factors having nothing to do with the underlying fundamentals of the dollar or the U.S. economy. In fact, all that has happened to the U.S. economy, and all that the government has done, and is likely to do, in their misguided attempts to contain the damage, is extremely bearish for the U.S. dollar.

Mesmerized by technical moves and oblivious as always to the fundamentals, the Wall Street brain trust has offered flimsy explanations. One popular rationale is that as bad as things are in the United States, they are even worse every place else. Still another is that since the U.S. was the first country into the crisis that we will be the first nation to come out. Still another is that since our government is acting more boldly than most to tackle the problems, our economy will not suffer as badly as others where governments have been slower to react and more timid in their responses. In addition, many still perceive the United States as the citadel of stability in a world of second-rate economies.

However, if we look beyond these "explanations," the fundamentals loom simple and irrefutable: American borrowers of all stripes cannot afford to repay the trillions of dollars we owe. Over the past decade, the vast majority of lending has come from abroad, and as Americans don't pay, the losses show up on foreign balance sheets. Since we blew most of the money we borrowed on consumption, we simply lack the industrial capacity to repay our debts without resorting to a printing press.

In bankruptcy, both the debtor and creditors are affected. However, while creditors take a financial hit, ramifications for debtors are typically more severe. Creditors are generally better prepared to absorb their losses. However, for bankrupt debtors usually much more substantial changes ensue.

Since America is the world's biggest debtor, with our IOU's broadly held by every creditor nation, the effects of our bankruptcy are being felt worldwide. However, while our creditors are suffering now, their pain will be temporary and relatively mild compared to what awaits Americans.

So while it may appear to some that things are worse abroad, that is only because the full extent of our problems has yet to be reckoned with. The main lesson our creditors will learn from this crisis is not to lend American consumers any more money. Once the lending stops, our "cart before the horse" borrow to spend economy will crumble. While the rest of the world absorbs their losses and moves on, we will be digging our way out of the rubble for years to come.

Earthquakes are caused by the fundamental shifts of tectonic plates beneath the Earth's surface. A similar move is underway in the global economy. Describing either event without a basic understanding of either geology or economics will simply result in a tale being told by an idiot.

For a more in depth analysis of our financial problems and the inherent dangers they pose for the U.S. economy and U.S. dollar denominated investments, read my just released book "The Little Book of Bull Moves in Bear Markets." Click here to order your copy now.

For a look back at how I predicted the current crisis, read my 2007 bestseller "Crash Proof: How to Profit from the Coming Economic Collapse." Click here to order a copy today

More importantly, don't wait for reality to set in. Protect your wealth and preserve your purchasing power before it's too late. Discover the best way to buy gold at www.goldyoucanfold.com. Download my free Special Report, "The Powerful Case for Investing in Foreign Securities" at www.researchreportone.com. Subscribe to my free, on-line investment newsletter, "The Global Investor" at http://www.europac.net/newsletter/newsletter.asp

October 19th 2008

The current stock market crash has spurred a vital national debate about the causes and catalysts of the Great Depression. The dominant school of thought believes that the stubborn refusal of then president Hebert Hoover to intervene after the stock market crash of 1929, and his preference for free market solutions, led directly to the ensuing decade-long catastrophe. Through this lens, our leaders assure us that the most recent raft of government measures will prevent another episode of bread lines, Hoovervilles and pencil salesmen. As usual they have it completely wrong. In my view, the Depression was created precisely because Hoover followed the path that our government is now taking.

When the stock market bubble of the Roaring Twenties (which was created as a result of the loose monetary policy of the newly created Federal Reserve) finally popped, Hoover would not allow market forces to correct the imbalances. His policies were aimed at propping up unsound businesses, artificially supporting prices, particularly wages, and providing Federal funds for public works projects. These moves went well beyond the progressive reforms of Teddy Roosevelt, and established Hoover as the most interventionist president ever up to that point. In fact, much of what eventually became the New Deal had its roots in Hoover's policies.

However, at the time, there were those who recommended a different course. Andrew Mellon, the long-serving Secretary of the Treasury whom Hoover had inherited from the prior two Republican Administrations, was labeled by Hoover as a "leave it alone isolationist" who wanted to "liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, and liquidate real estate." Hoover would have none of it. In fact, during his nomination speech for his second term, Hoover bragged "We determined that we would not follow the advice of the bitter liquidationists and see the whole body of debtors of the United States brought to bankruptcy and the savings of our people brought to destruction."

Hoover chose to ignore the sound advice of his Treasury Secretary (in contrast to today where the current Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson is actually leading the charge over the cliff) and instead used every tool at his disposal to "fix" the problem. As a result, rather than allowing a recession to run its course, with healthy and rapid liquidations of the mal-investments built up during the boom, Hoover inadvertently created what became the Great Depression.

When Roosevelt took office he continued the same failed policies only on a grander scale. The magnitude and the idiocy of many New Deal programs, such as the wage and price setting National Recovery Administration (NRA), compounded the problems. So while Mellon's advice would have caused a sharp but relatively brief economic downturn (which occurred after the Panic of 1907, for example), the Depression plodded on for nearly a decade until the country began gearing up for the Second World War.

In an amazing feat of revisionist history, somehow Hoover's interventionist policies have been completely forgotten. It is taken as fundamental that his inaction led to the Depression and Roosevelt's "heroics" got us out. Unfortunately, since we have learned nothing from history, we are about to repeat the very mistakes that lead to the most dire economic circumstance of the last century.

A major difference however, is that the structure of the U.S economy today is far weaker than it was in the fall of 1929. Years of reckless consumer borrowing and spending, and enormous trade and budget deficits have resulted in a hollowed out industrial base and an unmanageable mountain of debt owed to foreign creditors. Instead of the support of a strong currency backed by gold, the public now must deal with a modern Fed free to print as much money as politicians want. So rather than getting the benefits of falling consumer prices (as happened during the Depression), consumers today will contend with much higher consumer prices, even as the economy contracts.

With Barack Obama now waiting in the wings to conjure a newer New Deal, far larger than even FDR could have imagined, and at a time when we cannot even afford the old one, this will not be your grandfather's Depression. It may be much worse.